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NOTE 
THE TRIANGLE SHIRTWAIST FIRE  
AND THE MERRILL LYNCH ANALYST 
RATINGS SCANDAL: LEGISLATIVE AND 
PROSECUTORIAL RESPONSES TO 
CORPORATE MALFEASANCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The New York City of 1911 was very much the same as the New York 
City of 2001. Both boasted new economies churning out wealth for the 
nation on a massive scale. Both were mostly unregulated playgrounds filled 
with sharp dealing and corner cutting, and both systems were 
unsustainable.1 Both eras were marked by scandal: the Triangle Shirtwaist 
Fire of 1911 and the Merrill Lynch analyst rating scandal of 2001. The fire 
and the analyst scandals were both major events in New York City’s and 
the nation’s histories, and these scandals put a face on growing economic 
threat to millions of Americans. 
Transcending traditional governmental roles, New York State 
Assembly Majority Leader Al Smith and New York State Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer attempted unique solutions within New York State in response 
to the problems that caused each tragedy. This Note will examine the 
different methods each used and evaluate the relative effectiveness of each 
method. 
While Al Smith responded to the Triangle Fire with a series of 
legislative reforms, Spitzer pursued corporate malfeasance with ad hoc 
investments and media campaigns. Both solutions successfully prevented 
future malfeasance in the short term, yet the long term effects of a 
legislative solution provide a base for future reform and set a baseline of 
acceptable behavior. Investigations and widely publicized settlements may 
pillory the corporate bad actors, but they also seem to have few lasting 
effects and are deeply tied to the future office holders’ decisions on how to 
use the assets of their office. 
As New York State Assembly Majority Leader, Al Smith used the 
specially created Factory Investigating Commission as a tool to pass more 
than thirty-two new laws governing worker safety, most of which were 
signed into law.2 All modern worker safety laws are built upon this 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See DAVID VON DREHLE, TRIANGLE: THE FIRE THAT CHANGED AMERICA 13 (2003) 
(citing the massive growth in New York City around the turn of the century). 
 2. See ROBERT A. SLAYTON, EMPIRE STATESMAN: THE RISE AND REDEMPTION OF AL 
SMITH 98 (2001). 
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legislative base.3 In fact, Franklin Roosevelt once said of the New Deal: 
“Practically all the things we’ve done in the federal government are like 
things Al Smith did.”4 Smith is also praised today by opponents of federal 
power for using New York State as a laboratory of democracy to pass laws 
that, once they demonstrated their effectiveness, were passed by the federal 
government.5 
Eliot Spitzer has used the Attorney General’s office to pursue corporate 
reforms, but he has chosen to use the prosecutorial tools of his office, 
specifically the far ranging Martin Act,6 to publicize corporate criminality, 
rather than trying to twin that with an attempt to affect systemic reform 
through codification.7 The Martin Act was meant to fight fraud, and it 
allowed Spitzer to “subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, examine 
them under oath . . . and require the production of any books or papers . . . 
deem[ed] relevant or material . . .” to his investigations.8 The law does not 
require the attorney general to impose a judicial sanction or even to charge 
the subjects of these inquiries with a crime.9 Spitzer used the power given to 
him under the Martin Act to compel disclosure of Merrill Lynch’s internal 
e-mails, which he then disclosed to the press.10 This tactic led to a public 
shaming of Merrill Lynch, as the e-mails disclosed that Merrill Lynch 
analysts and star technology analyst Henry Blodget were publicly touting 
stocks they privately derided.11 
Al Smith used the publicity from his investigations to become the first 
Catholic Governor of New York State and later the first Catholic major 
party candidate for President.12 Eliot Spitzer has also parlayed the publicity 
from his investigations into his election as Governor of New York State, 
and his national reputation raises the possibility that he too may run for 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Id. (dust jacket). 
 4. Id. 
 5. BROOKE A. MASTERS, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT: THE RISE OF ELIOT SPITZER 14 (2006). 
Smith’s legislative program was, as Roosevelt said, the intellectual forbearer of the New Deal. It 
should be noted, however, that Smith later publicly broke with Roosevelt and claimed that 
Roosevelt’s reforms went far beyond anything Smith had created while he was Governor and 
State Assembly Majority Leader in New York State. 
 6. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW art. 23-A, §§ 352 to 359-h (McKinney 2005). 
 7. See id. § 352. See also Nicholas Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFFAIRS 
MAGAZINE, May/June (2004), at 2; Ben White & Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Wall Street Probe Puts 
Prosecutor in Spotlight, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2002, at A1. 
 8. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352. 
 9. See id. 
 10. CHARLES GASPARINO, BLOOD ON THE STREET: THE SENSATIONAL INSIDE STORY OF HOW 
WALL STREET ANALYSTS DUPED A GENERATION OF INVESTORS 246 (2005). 
 11. Id. at 246–47. 
 12. See SLAYTON, supra note 2, at 299, 321–22. Smith was elected Governor in 1918. After 
losing his re-election campaign in 1920, as a result of a Republican landslide, he was returned to 
office in 1922. Smith served as Governor until he ran for President in 1928 and lost to Herbert 
Hoover. 
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President someday.13 Their differing responses to corporate malfeasance 
show two possible solutions state actors can employ to check quasi-criminal 
behavior, and these solutions should be an instructive lesson in government 
responses to future corporate scandals. 
Americans became aware of the massive nature of corporate scandals 
through the very public failure of WorldCom and Enron. These failures and 
the ensuing stock market decline sparked the drive for corporate reform.14 
Spitzer’s investigations fed the growing din for change, but they were 
neither the sole precursors nor the main impetus for reform.15 
Focusing on Spitzer’s first investigation of Merrill Lynch, it is possible 
to see how an abuse of the system could have been corrected by state, and 
later federal, legislation. By not using the momentum gained by the 
stunning disclosures of stock analysts’ practices to support meaningful 
legislative change, this Note concludes that Eliot Spitzer lost a golden 
opportunity to either let New York State take the lead in regulating stock 
analysts or put forth proposals for legislation based on his unique 
experience and perspective regarding what had gone wrong at Merrill 
Lynch. By staying silent, Spitzer robbed legislators of the benefit of his 
experience and made an already difficult job even more impossible. 
Part II of this Note examines the traditional roles of Tammany Hall, the 
political machine that spawned Al Smith, and the traditional roles played by 
Eliot Spitzer’s predecessors as State Attorney General. In addition, this Part 
also examines New York’s factory economy at the turn of the 20th century 
and its financial markets at the dawn of the 21st. Part III recounts the 
Triangle Shirtwaist Fire and the legislative path to reform. Part IV tells the 
story of the Merrill Lynch stock analyst ratings scandal and analyzes the 
effectiveness of Eliot Spitzer’s reforms. Part V explains the criminal justice 
system’s failure to serve a deterrent or retributive role for the corporate 
actors involved. Part VI examines Spitzer’s preference for a prosecutorial or 
investigative solution and concludes that a legislative solution to corporate 
malfeasance, along the lines of Al Smith’s Factory Investigating 
Commission, would have served the public far better than Eliot Spitzer’s 
use of the Martin Act. 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Many national publications have touted a potential Spitzer candidacy for President. 
Spitzer, for his part, has not claimed national ambitions, but by the same token he has done little to 
discourage these Presidential speculations. If Spitzer’s public comments on running for Governor 
were any indication, a run for President may well be in the cards. See Raymond Hernandez, 
Finding Fraud On Wall St. May Be Step to Higher Post, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 2003, at C4. 
 14. John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s Perspective, 
76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57 (2005). 
 15. Id. at 57–59 (discussing the scope of the Enron fraud). 
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II. BEGINNINGS 
A. NEW YORK CITY AT THE TURN OF THE 20TH CENTURY 
By the dawn of the 20th century, New York City’s primary industry 
was manufacturing.16 Factories hummed from dawn until well past dusk, 
churning out products that traveled across the country and the world. One of 
the major contributors was New York’s garment industry.17 In 1791, 
Alexander Hamilton had estimated that two-thirds to four-fifths of 
American clothing was home-spun, but by the 20th century almost all 
clothing was store bought.18 This rapid change was a result of several 
factors. The increased movement of Americans to cities, combined with the 
specialization of farmers and the democratization of concepts like leisure 
time and fashion, brought a need for more and better quality clothes.19 City 
dwellers bought their clothes in department stores while rural residents 
ordered theirs from mail-order catalogues. Technological innovations had 
made it easy to mass-produce garments, but these machines caused a 
massive demand for cheap labor, which the influx of eastern European 
immigrants around the turn of the 20th century rapidly met.20 The means 
and scale of production had changed, as had the relationships among 
worker, manager, and owner, but the laws regulating factories and 
protecting workers were stuck in a much earlier age.21 
According to a survey taken in the 1890s, the average work week for 
immigrant garment workers was eighty-four hours a week, which translated 
to twelve hours a day, seven days a week.22 A dependent and impoverished 
class of workers cried out to muckraking journalists and social reformers 
for help, yet the New York State Legislature and the New York City 
Council voted down or buried legislation that would ameliorate their harsh 
working and living conditions.23 Industrialists had created an alliance 
between business and urban political machines.24 Immigrants from Ireland, 
Italy, Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Jews from Russia and Eastern 
Europe made up the predominant support for the machines.25 The stalwart 
machine voters were often the most exploited workers, but it was not until 
the early 20th century that machine politicians and reformers formed an 
alliance to create worker protections. 
                                                                                                                 
 16. DREHLE, supra note 1, at 15. 
 17. Id. at 41. 
 18. Id. at 39. 
 19. Id. at 44. 
 20. Id. at 39. 
 21. Id. at 15. 
 22. Id. at 41. 
 23. See CHRISTOPHER M. FINAN & ALFRED E. SMITH: THE HAPPY WARRIOR 88–89 (2002). 
 24. See id. at 89. 
 25. OLIVER E. ALLEN, THE TIGER 145–46 (1993). 
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Machine leaders were initially reluctant to join forces with reformers. 
First, “reform” candidates routinely ran against machine candidates for 
office and, as a result, machine leaders saw reformers as their main enemy 
at the ballot box.26 Second, political machines gained financial support from 
industry leaders.27 In fact, many machine leaders were the very same 
businessmen who benefited from lax worker protections.28 Most impor-
tantly, however, in the years before social welfare and the safety net, the 
political machine was the safety net, and replacing it with government 
protections would threaten the machine’s ability to dole out benefits and 
reap the rewards on Election Day.29 
In his book Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, William Riordon describes a day 
in the life of the esteemed Tammany Hall District Leader, and sometime 
State Senator, Alderman and City Councilman George Washington 
Plunkitt.30 In the course of an average day, Plunkitt fed and sheltered fire 
victims, helped constituents obtain civil service jobs, represented local 
drunks before a judge and promised funding for a local church.31 Plunkett 
also made time to attend the weddings, funerals, religious services, 
christenings, confirmations, bar-mitzvahs and picnics that a District Leader 
must attend in order to keep touch with his constituents.32 For his 
constituents, George Washington Plunkitt was the social safety net, and it 
was for this reason that many voters tolerated the corruption and graft so 
endemic in the 19th Century urban political machine.33 
The appeal of machine leaders was so intertwined with their ability to 
dole out favors that using government as a tool of social change struck at 
their success. It also threatened to break the lucrative ties machines held to 
industry leaders. It would be a machine Democrat, however, who would 
harness the power of Tammany Hall and create protections for factory 
workers throughout New York State. 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See id. at 226 (citing, as an example, a Tammany leader and a reform activist working 
together). 
 27. See id. at 201. 
 28. Id. at 210. “Silent” Charlie Murphy, the legendary boss of Tammany Hall, was considered 
one of the most honest members of Tammany, and it was his patronage and support which 
allowed Al Smith to organize the Factory Investigations Commission. However, even he was not 
above graft. One of Murphy’s major sources of income was the New York Contracting and 
Trucking Company, which leased piers from the City of New York and turned a 5,000% profit. 
Conflicts of interest like this were endemic and were even rationalized by Tammany supporters as 
“honest” graft. Id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. WILLIAM L. RIORDAN, PLUNKITT OF TAMMANY HALL: A SERIES OF VERY PLAIN TALKS 
ON VERY PRACTICAL POLITICS 90 (Meridian 1991) (1963). 
 31. Id. at 91–93. 
 32. Id. at 90–98. 
 33. See id. 
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B. MARKETING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN NEW YORK CITY 
TODAY 
Today, New York City is no longer a manufacturing city.34 Instead, the 
financial services industry has taken over as a pillar of the tax base and as 
an employment provider.35 Commensurate to its explosion in New York 
City, the financial services industry has also experienced a tremendous 
growth in scope and visibility throughout American life. Money is no 
longer solid, and each bill paid or check written is no longer like a slice or 
chip off the bi-monthly loaf with the remainder stored under the mattress or 
in a bank.36 Instead, a wide variety of investment products have turned 
money into liquid flowing in and out of the ever expanding portfolio of 
investments and liabilities carried by the average investor.37 Today over 
60% of Americans own stock either personally or through their retirement 
or pension plans.38 Money now flows from one perception to another at the 
push of a button, and as investment opportunities continue to grow and 
Americans derive more and more wealth from investments instead of 
wages, Americans’ need for information about the financial markets 
grows.39 
The growth of company pension funds, mutual funds, and investing as a 
pastime and hobby has meant that now, more than any other time in history, 
average Americans have a direct stake in the stock market.40 As a result, 
financial news and planning is no longer merely the province of the 
wealthy. This explosion of interest in finance and the stock market has been 
a boon to New York City, and it has once again made New York the center 
of a growing engine of business. Rapid growth and change, however, have 
quickly outpaced regulatory changes. New York State has traditionally 
played a very small role in the actual enforcement of financial regulations.41 
Almost every major financial institution has its main presence in New York 
City. However, until Eliot Spitzer, the New York State Attorney General 
traditionally maintained a hands-off policy on regulating Wall Street.42 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See Steven Kurutz, He Heart (Made In) New York, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, at 12. 
 35. Heather Timmons, New York Isn’t The World’s Undisputed Financial Capital, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 27 2006, at C1. 
 36. See Grover Norquist, The Democratic Party Is Toast, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 1, 2004,  
at 27. 
 37. See GASPARINO, supra note 10, at 96–97. 
 38. Norquist, supra note 36.  
 39. See GASPARINO, supra note 10, at 97. 
 40. See id. (noting that at the height of the bull market in 2000, American households held 
$7.7 trillion dollars in assets in the stock market, an almost nine-fold increase from American 
household stock holdings in 1980). 
 41. See Phillip Weinberg, Office of N.Y. Attorney General Sets Pace for Others Nationwide, 76 
N.Y. ST. B.J. 10 (2001) (discussing the powers and role of New York State’s Attorney General). 
 42. Id. 
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C. THE ROLE OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL: 
THEN AND NOW 
The position of New York State Attorney General is often considered 
the waiting room of New York State politics—in fact, it is said that the 
initials of the office stand for Almost Governor.43 In the past half century, 
almost every single Attorney General has run for higher office, so it should 
come as no surprise that the position often attracts publicity seekers.44 One 
of only four statewide elected offices, the office of Attorney General offers 
the possibility of statewide media exposure and the promise of a path to 
election as either Senator or Governor. In fact, New York State’s third 
Attorney General was none other than the original publicity seeking 
politician: Aaron Burr.45 
The modern history of New York State’s Attorney General Office is 
dominated by two street fighting ethnic politicians from New York City, 
Louis Lefkowitz and Robert Abrams. Louis Lefkowitz was first appointed 
in 1957 to replace Jacob Javitz, who had been elected to the Senate.46 
Lefkowitz followed the mold of the fiscally moderate and socially liberal 
policies of Nelson Rockefeller, and his tenure was marked by his desire to 
drive the debate on civil rights legislation in New York and his aggressive 
consumer oriented prosecutions.47 Lefkowitz prided himself on a political 
independence and often, like his successor Robert Abrams, declined to 
defend Governor’s actions in the courts.48 
Abrams was also a native of New York City and, like Lefkowitz, found 
a kindred ideological spirit in the Governor with whom he served. Although 
Lefkowitz and Abrams were from different political parties, their focus in 
office remained the same. They were committed to the liberal ideals of 
social justice, as well as with bread and butter issues like consumer fraud. 
From 1992–2000, New York State saw two short term, undistinguished 
Attorney Generals. However, Eliot Spitzer’s election in November 2000 
marked the broadening of the Attorney General’s Office and a new role for 
the Attorney General himself. 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Kathleen Lucadamo, Rudy Shaking the Money Tree for Pirro, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 28, 
2006. 
 44. Weinberg, supra note 41. 
 45. See New York State, Complete List of the Previous New York State Attorneys General 
1626–Current, http://www.oag.state.ny.us/previous_aglist.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
 46. Weinberg, supra note 41. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Wayne Barrett, Why Did Spitzer Defend Pataki?, VILLAGE VOICE, July 8, 2003, at 24. 
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III. FIRE! THE TRIANGLE SHIRTWAIST FIRE AND THE 
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 
A. FIRE BREAKS OUT: THE TRIANGLE SHIRTWAIST FIRE 
Near closing time on Saturday afternoon, March 25, 1911, a fire broke 
out49 at the Triangle Shirtwaist Company, located on the eighth, ninth and 
tenth floors of the Asch Building in New York City’s Greenwich Village.50 
It started in a pile of rags and spread rapidly.51 On the ninth floor, as 
workers tried to rush down the fire escape to safety, they found the doors to 
the fire escape chained shut.52 Rather than burn to death from the flames or 
be asphyxiated by the smoke, workers leapt from the building onto the 
street below.53 William G. Shepard, a correspondent for United Press, 
described the sound: “Thud-dead, thud-dead, thud-dead, thud-dead. Sixty-
two thud-deads. I call them that, because the sound and the thought of death 
came to me each time, at the same instant. There was plenty of chance to 
watch them as they came down. The height was eighty feet.”54 Shepard 
completed his story with this message: 
The floods of water from the fireman’s hose that ran into the gutter were 
actually stained red with blood. I looked upon the heaps of dead bodies 
and I remembered these girls were the shirtwaist makers. I remembered 
their great strike of last year in which these same girls had demanded more 
sanitary conditions and more safety precautions in the shops. These dead 
bodies were the answer.55 
In its account of the fire, The New York Times also led with a damning 
indictment of a system that had come to see workers as expendable. The 
article stated: 
The building is fireproof. It shows hardly any signs of the disaster that 
overtook it. The walls are as good as ever so are the floors, nothing is the 
worse for the fire except the furniture and 141 of the 600 men and girls 
that were employed in its upper three stories.56 
                                                                                                                 
 49. DREHLE, supra note 1, at 116–19. 
 50. Id. at 46–47, 117. 
 51. Id. at 119. 
 52. Id. at 123, 127, 267. Chaining the doors shut was common practice by employers to 
prevent workers from leaving their benches during the work day. 
 53. Id. at 155. 
 54. William G. Shepherd, Eyewitness at the Triangle, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 27, 1911. 
 55. Id. 
 56. 141 Men and Girls Die in Waist Factory Fire; Trapped High Up in Washington Place 
Building; Street Strewn With Bodies; Piles of Dead Inside, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 1. 
Several months before the fire broke out, the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory had been the setting for 
one of the most acrimonious battles of the labor movement. Blanck and Harris hired prostitutes 
and gangsters to defeat organizers from the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and after 
several violent clashes, defeated a plan to unionize the shop. The use of prostitutes to assault 
female workers was a common industry practice. See DREHLE, supra note 1, at 6–12. 
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By the end of the day, 146 bodies had fallen to the street or had been 
consumed by the flames.57 
The owners of the factory, Max Blanck and Isaac Harris, like most of 
the fire victims, were first generation Jewish immigrants from Russia.58 
They had immigrated to America with little but the clothes on their back, 
and like their employees had spent the early part of their lives in the back- 
breaking conditions of the sweatshop.59 Blanck and Harris worked their way 
up the ladder from small contract manufacturers, and by 1911, they were 
the largest shirtwaist manufacturers in the country.60 Their lives seemed to 
be straight out of a Horatio Alger story. Born into poverty, they were now 
chauffeured to work and lived in neighboring townhouses on the 
fashionable Upper West Side of Manhattan. Blanck and Harris boasted 
cooks, maids, laundresses, governesses and, for Max Blanck’s newborn 
baby, a nurse.61 They were perfect models for the ethos that preached that 
hard work would eventually lead to success. 
They were neither the cruelest factory owners nor the kindest, and their 
factories were neither noteworthy nor notorious; but it was the mundane 
quality of their business practices that made the ensuing disaster of the 
Triangle fire so disturbing. The question could now be asked: If a fire this 
large and this deadly could happen to the “Shirtwaist Kings,” where else 
could it happen, and how many more people would have to die before 
anything changed?62 
B. MR. SMITH GOES TO ALBANY 
Into the breach stepped a politically ambitious product of Tammany 
Hall. Al Smith was born on Oliver Street, far from Blanck’s and Harris’s 
townhouses on the Upper West Side, but just one mile south of the Asch 
Building.63 When Smith was fourteen his father died, and Smith was forced 
to work to support his family.64 He was always proud of his work as a truck 
                                                                                                                 
 57. DREHLE, supra note 1, at 3, 155. 
 58. Id. at 38. 
 59. Id. The term sweatshop is used today to connote any working conditions that may be 
considered substandard or poor. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, however, the term was a 
description of a very specific type of operation that lay at the bottom of the manufacturing ladder. 
Newly arrived immigrants, otherwise know as greenhorns, were snatched up by unscrupulous 
contractors. The contractors provided, according to one survey, over ninety percent of all the 
garments manufactured in the trade. They would use crowded tenement rooms, often their own 
living quarters, and cram in as many immigrants and sewing machines as they could. In these dim, 
dirty, and claustrophobic conditions, the contractors “sweated” their workers, aiming to undercut 
their competition. Id. 
 60. Id. at 37, 44. Shirtwaists would be known today as blouses and in late 19th and early 20th 
Century life were an essential part of a women’s wardrobe. Blanck and Harris became so 
successful that they were dubbed “The Shirtwaist Kings.” Id. 
 61. Id. at 36–37. 
 62. Id. at 37. 
 63. SLAYTON, supra note 2, at 3. 
 64. Id. at 36. 
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chaser, and in later years, at the Fulton Fish Market and throughout his 
career, he would contrast his background with the Ivy League educated 
colleagues with whom he served.65 In a telling anecdote from his service in 
the State Assembly, Smith was on the floor of the Assembly when the 
results of a recent crew race were announced.66 One by one, his colleagues 
took turns taking the floor to extol their alma mater, each reciting the race 
in which his university had won, saying, “I’m a Harvard man” or “I’m a 
Yale man.”67 When Smith took the floor, in an act that caused much 
confusion among his colleagues, he proudly proclaimed himself an “F.F.M. 
man,”68 which he later explained stood for the initials of the Fulton Fish 
Market.69 
Despite his modest background, or perhaps because of it, Smith was 
recognized as a rising star by Tammany Hall leaders, and he was elected to 
the State Assembly in 1903 when he was barely thirty years old.70 After his 
election Smith read bills and books on parliamentary procedure during the 
evenings, nights and weekends and soon became a master of the legislative 
process.71 When the Democrats re-took the Assembly in 1910, Smith 
became Majority Leader of the State Assembly.72 In the wake of the 
Triangle Fire, newly minted Majority Leader Smith was also named the Co-
Chair of the Factory Investigating Commission, along with State Senate 
Majority Leader, and future U.S. Senator, Robert Wagner.73 Through this 
Commission, Smith turned the tables on corporate accountability and found 
a new role for the urban political machine.74 
C. THE FACTORY INVESTIGATING COMMISSION, IF YOU BUILD IT 
REFORM WILL COME 
The Factory Investigating Commission was both a bully pulpit for 
Smith and a tool to reform manufacturing corporations. While it might have 
been given a different name at the time, Smith’s pursuits were the corollary 
to Spitzer’s crusade. Investigators on Smith’s Commission uncovered what 
today might be described as “corporate malfeasance” on a truly shocking 
scale. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 65. FINAN, supra note 23, at 61. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 47. 
 71. DREHLE, supra note 1, at 203–04. Smith had been forced to leave school after eighth 
grade, which put him at a significant disadvantage compared to his better-educated colleagues.   
 72. Id. at 213. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. 
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The idea to create a commission was originally Smith’s.75 Rich people, 
he explained to the trade unionists, were “always very busy, and you can’t 
get their attention for very long.”76 Smith suggested a legislative 
commission with the power to craft legislation.77 In that instant, Smith 
wedded the power to reach New Yorkers through the sensational 
campaigns, to which muckrakers were accustomed, with the legislative 
power to affect change and actually change conditions rather than just decry 
them. 
It was rough going for the Factory Investigating Commission at first. 
The New York State legislature appropriated only a $10,000 budget (a little 
less than $200,000 in today’s dollars)78 to the Commission for staff and 
expenses. The enabling act further restricted investigations to the nine 
largest cities in the state, and the Commission received jurisdiction over fire 
safety. However, when the Commission decided to look under the rocks of 
modern industrialism, and the Commission’s stories began appearing in 
papers across the state, its mandate grew. Soon, newspapers began to cover 
the Commission’s investigations, and the stories that followed tugged at the 
hearts of all New Yorkers. Husbands and wives worked opposing shifts at a 
rope factory in Auburn and had time to kiss each other goodbye only as 
their shifts began and ended.79 In canneries, children as young as three 
worked eighteen hour shifts.80 One child expressed the hopelessness, 
despair, and cruelty of his fate when he responded to a question asking how 
long he had been working by saying, “Ever since I was.”81 
As revelations of working conditions kept coming, public pressure 
buoyed Smith’s legislative efforts. Through the Commission’s work, New 
York State passed legislation that laid the groundwork for modern labor 
laws. Before the Commission, the law required buildings to be fireproof, 
but the buildings’ occupants received no protection.82 Smith passed 
legislation that mandated fire drills and sprinklers.83 
The Commission expanded its purview and took on legislation 
regulating all aspects of factory working conditions.84 Under the new 
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legislation, “[w]omen could not be forced to work for four weeks after a 
pregnancy; clean facilities for washing, eating, and toilet functions were 
also mandatory . . . .”85 This change not only brought dividends for workers, 
but was also a victory for public health.86 Children under fourteen could no 
longer work in cannery sheds or tenements, a small step towards the 
eventual banning of child labor.87 Factories had to provide seats with backs 
for women.88 Work for women was limited in canneries, and their hours of 
night work were also curtailed.89 Slowly chipping away at the hours women 
were forced to work created a time for recreation and rest, which for Smith 
were essential elements in maintaining the values of family.90 Losing his 
father at fourteen, watching his mother struggle, and working to support his 
family made this a personal cause for Smith. When critics asked him if his 
limits on night work for women went too far, he responded, “You can’t tell 
me. I’ve seen these women. I’ve seen their faces. I’ve seen them.”91 
The Factory Investigating Commission produced thirty-two bills, most 
of which were signed into law.92 Following its lead, New York City passed 
thirty ordinances.93 New York State’s Labor Commissioner had the power 
to close down any establishment and label any product “unclean” if there 
was evidence of a contagious disease.94 By 1912, New York State had 
conducted 132,601 fire inspections.95 By 1920, it had 123 factory 
inspectors.96 
The Factory Investigating Commission combined the best aspects of 
legislative power and investigative tools. A staff brimming with eager 
reformers brought to light abuses that cried out for change.97 Their actions 
alone were not noteworthy. In fact, reformers had been bringing these 
abuses to light for years. But now, their efforts combined with legislators 
who were determined to change the law. 
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The Commission was able to hold the public’s interest through 
sustained dramatic revelations of factory conditions that shocked and 
appalled New York State. Unlike previous campaigns, which through 
books, speeches, pictures, and exhibitions reached only an audience already 
in sympathy with progressive campaigners, the Commission captured a 
state-wide audience and held it with continuing revelations and exposés. 
The constant media drumbeat served as the fuel for reform. Without a 
continued media spotlight, those whose interests had successfully beaten 
reformers countless times before would have undoubtedly buried, stalled or 
blocked the legislation.98 
V. SCANDAL! THE MERRILL LYNCH ANALYST RATINGS 
SCANDAL AND THE PROSECUTORIAL RESPONSE 
A. ENTER SPITZER 
In June 2001, another politically ambitious Democrat sought to seize 
the mantle of reform. Eliot Spitzer’s past was almost the polar opposite of 
Al Smith’s. The scion of a wealthy family, Spitzer was educated in 
exclusive private schools: he graduated from Princeton and earned a law 
degree from Harvard.99 Spitzer didn’t work within the Democratic Party 
while waiting his turn to run for office, but instead, leveraged his family 
money and connections to eke out a close victory against a weak 
Republican incumbent.100 
Like their backgrounds, their approaches to corporate malfeasance were 
also different. While Smith sought to reform corporate practice through 
legislation, Spitzer chose publicity and prosecution. 
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B. THE MARTIN ACT, FROM OUT OF THE BLUE CLEAR SKY COMES 
SPITZER’S ANSWER 
Spitzer’s authority to compel the disclosure of Merrill Lynch’s e-mails 
was based on New York State’s Martin Act, which passed in 1921 and, 
interestingly enough, was signed into law by then-Governor Smith.101 The 
Act gave a prosecutor in New York State virtually unchecked power to 
pursue fiscal malfeasance.102 The Martin Act has its origins in the “Blue 
Sky” laws of the early 20th Century. The original authors of the Act called 
it the “blue sky” law for their contention that the targets of these anti-fraud 
statutes would “[s]ell you the sky if they could.”103 However, one might 
make the point that a purchaser foolish enough to make such a bargain 
might indeed fall within the bounds of caveat emptor. 
The prosecutorial bark of the Martin Act allows the investigator a wide 
ambit in calling for the production of documents and affords limited 
protections to witnesses.104 The criminal bite of the statute, however, is 
limited to misdemeanor prosecutions.105 The statute’s main intent seems not 
to be to aid a prosecutorial strategy, but rather to allow prosecutors a vast 
array of discovery weapons with which they can build fraud cases against 
con-artists and other tricksters. Spitzer’s strategy was to combine the power 
of the Martin Act with public exposure and leverage the damage that would 
be done with the volatile nature of the stock market. 
Spitzer’s investigations were wide ranging and encompassed almost 
every sector of Wall Street, from late trading to the insurance industry.106 
The Martin Act and the press conference were his sword and hammer. This 
prosecutorial technique has been hailed as a new way for states to intervene 
in what has been traditionally a federal area.107 As Spitzer moves to higher 
office though, the question becomes: Have Spitzer’s tactics improved 
industry practices concerning stock market analysts, and are they more 
effective than the methods used by Al Smith and his Factory Investigating 
Commission? 
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C. HENRY BLODGET & MERRILL LYNCH, THE SCANDAL UNFOLDS 
AND A SCHEME UNRAVELS 
If the industrial revolution was about turning human labor and raw 
materials into a finished product, the information revolution was about 
using human intellect to distill and organize raw information into 
cognizable and understandable data. Thus, as the doors of the stock market 
were flung open, a ravenous need for information developed. Traditionally, 
this need had been met by stock market analysts who were considered 
experts in certain fields or sectors of the economy. Their work was highly 
valued, but in the 1990’s they found themselves besieged on all sides by 
unethical temptations and pressures.108 
The case study of Merrill Lynch technology analyst Henry Blodget 
provides an example of the temptations of the typical tech stock market 
analyst. Blodget’s actions, like those of factory owners Blanck and Harris, 
were typical to those in his profession. A former fact-checker and journalist, 
Blodget stumbled into stock analysis and shot to fame by predicting that 
Amazon.com would reach $400 a share, a prediction that the stock quickly 
reached and surpassed.109 Blodget was then hired by Merrill Lynch in a 
highly publicized move to be a star financial analyst and, in Merrill Lynch’s 
words, a “rainmaker.”110 Blodget was already one of the most well known 
voices of the bull market, and at Merrill Lynch he continued to urge the 
purchase of technology stocks.111 Merrill Lynch used Blodget as a way to 
build its investment banking business,112 billing him as part of a package 
deal. The pitch roughly became: use us and our analysts—especially Henry 
Blodget—will tout your stock.113 
Initially, Blodget was extremely accurate in his stock picks, but the run 
up of the stock market during the bullish 1990’s could not last forever. In 
internal e-mails and to his peers, even Henry Blodget discussed what he 
saw to be the end of the Internet bubble and the worthlessness of some of 
his stock picks.114 When Eliot Spitzer gained access to Merrill Lynch’s e-
mails, these e-mails from Blodget were the smoking gun.115 What emerged 
was a duplicitous pattern where Blodget would publicly announce that a 
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stock “presents an attractive investment,” while he would privately e-mail a 
co-worker that he couldn’t believe “what a POS [piece of sh-t]” the stock 
was.116 In a particularly egregious example, Blodget publicly called 
Infospace.com “one of the best ways to play the wireless Internet.”117 Yet, 
privately, he referred to it as “a piece of junk.”118 On June 11, 2000, when 
Blodget made his predictions, Infospace.com’s stock closed at $596.88, on 
a volume of 579,310 shares.119 On March 18, 2007, Infospace.com closed at 
$25.14 a share, on about the same volume as June 11, 2000, a drop of over 
96.5% in value.120 
It is important to note that Infospace.com was a major Merrill Lynch 
investment banking customer, and Blodget’s compensation, like that of 
many other analysts, was tied to investment banking profits.121 The nature 
of the stock market thrust analysts like Blodget into highly public roles 
where their predictions affected billions of dollars in stock value, yet their 
activities as analysts generated few if any direct profits for investment 
banks.122 
It is easy to concentrate on the eye popping amounts of stock value that 
were lost during the tech stock bust, but it is important to remember that 
these lost billions represented retirement and college funds, lost homes and 
broken families. The sudden drop in the stock market led many people to 
begin to cast around for blame. Stock analysts who had been feeding the 
boom with rosy predictions, which they broadcast on CNBC, magazine, 
newspapers, and websites, were the most obvious targets.123 
One of those investors was Debasis Kanjilal.124 Kanjilal had invested 
over $500,000 in two technology stocks, one of which was Infospace.com, 
on the advice of Henry Blodget’s reports.125 Kanjilal’s lawyer alleged that 
conflict tainted Blodget’s analysis—Infospace was seeking to acquire 
Go2Net, a Merrill investment banking client.126 Although Spitzer had not 
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filed any criminal charges against Merrill Lynch, he did have enough 
evidence to fulfill the Martin Act’s requirement that Merrill Lynch’s 
behavior was part of a “scheme or artifice.” 127 As a result, Spitzer was able 
to launch an investigation.128 In April 2001, the office subpoenaed all 
documentation from Merrill that concerned initial public offerings (IPOs), 
stock recommendations, and compensation for research analysts like 
Blodget.129 After wading through e-mails, Spitzer’s investigators struck 
gold in Blodget’s comments. 
D. SPITZER TO THE RESCUE! REFORMS AND RESPONSE TO THE 
SCANDAL 
Spitzer immediately published the revelations in a stunning press 
release that distilled the over 100,000 pages of Merrill Lynch documents 
and e-mails into one clear message: Merrill Lynch analysts knew the stocks 
they were pushing were poor investment choices.130 Forty-three days after 
Spitzer’s press release, Merrill Lynch settled.131 Merrill Lynch made no 
admission of guilt and paid only a $100 million fine, which, to put their 
penalty in perspective, is less than the volume of Infospace.com for two and 
one half hours after Henry Blodget’s recommendation.132 From Spitzer, 
Blodget received a pass and was not charged with any offense.133 Only the 
NASD charged Blodget with securities fraud and forced him to pay a $4 
million fine. At no point was Blodget required to admit any wrongdoing, 
but he was banned from any future stock market involvement.134 
Nevertheless, in a rejoinder to F. Scott Fitzgerald’s contention that “there 
are no second acts to American lives,”135 he currently writes a column for 
Slate.com and an investor-based blog.136 In addition to Blodget, his 
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supervisor, Jack Grubman, and other co-workers paid fines and made 
agreements similar to Blodget’s.137 
Spitzer did require, as a major portion of the settlement, that Merrill 
Lynch make reforms within its analyst department. Merrill Lynch made six 
substantive changes to its policies, which included prohibiting input from 
the investment department to analysts; severing the link between 
compensation for analysts and the investment banking department; creating 
a new investment committee to review analysts recommendations; creating 
a monitor for compliance; requiring that if research is discontinued for a 
company that Merrill Lynch’s analysts previously covered, a report be 
issued on why this occurred; and finally, requiring disclosure in research 
reports if Merrill Lynch has received any compensation from a covered 
company in the past twelve months.138 
“By adopting the reforms embodied in the settlement, Merrill Lynch is 
setting a new standard for the rest of the industry to follow.”139 Eliot 
Spitzer’s comments in the wake of the settlement show his hope that the 
concessions he had wrung from Merrill Lynch would become standard.140 
From his statement, it seems that Spitzer viewed this settlement as a catalyst 
to force the industry to become self policing.141 By creating an industry 
standard of the separation between analyst and investment banking 
functions, Spitzer would make it a viable option for other firms.142 
An interesting analogy can be made to the noted labor leader Samuel 
Gompers and his position on Al Smith’s factory reforms. Gompers was at 
the forefront of the movement to reform manufacturers but opposed 
government intervention because he believed that only a vibrant trade-union 
movement would make the manufacturing industry self-policing.143 He felt 
that government intervention would not be effective and would handicap 
labor’s ability to monitor management.144 Gompers, like Spitzer, sought 
industry compliance without the force of legislation. 
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Congress’s initial response to Spitzer’s investigation of Merrill Lynch 
was a letter from Representative Richard Baker, Republican from Louisiana 
and Chairman of the Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial 
Markets, to the SEC and the forty-nine other state attorney generals asking 
them not to follow Spitzer’s example and promising curbs on the powers 
from Congress if they did so.145 Spitzer was not cowed by Baker’s letter and 
continued to investigate the financial services industry.146 Finally, the SEC 
did reach an agreement with Wall Street’s major investment banks though 
the December 2002 “Global Settlement,”147 which incorporated the 
benchmarks set in the settlement with Merrill Lynch. Eventually, many of 
these regulations would be grafted onto the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
adopted into law.148 
E. AN ANALYSIS OF SPITZER’S EFFECTIVENESS 
Investorside, a non-profit advocacy group created in the wake of the 
stock analyst scandals has been a tremendous beneficiary of Spitzer’s 
actions, and the group invited him to speak at a recent conference.149 
Despite this relationship, by the group’s own calculations, 95% of the top 
eighty-two firms on Wall Street have inherent conflicts of interests, the 
conflict being the basic existence of an investment banking department.150 
The numbers cast doubt on any claims that the system has changed. 
Spitzer’s investigations against stock analysts came to a final fruition 
when regulators forced the several structural reforms Spitzer had urged on 
Merrill Lynch on the brokerage industry as a whole.151 In his speech to 
Investorside, Spitzer made the point that it may not be possible to measure 
the effectiveness of reforms “because market conditions change and there 
are too many variables.”152 That may well be true, and in this regard, the 
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evidence is very cloudy. Spitzer went on to claim success based on the fact 
that, “an analysis preformed by U.S.A. Today, given a hypothetical portfolio 
from brokerage analysts’ recommendations, showed that the internal 
recommendations would have under-preformed industry benchmarks in ‘02, 
and in ‘03 and ‘04, they beat the S&P by 2.2 percentage points.”153 As 
Spitzer goes on to point out, this information is only a “relevant data point” 
and not the end of the conversation.154 By that same token, a September 
2006 analysis of analyst sell ratings showed a 32% drop in sell ratings from 
10.4% in 2003 to 7.1% in September of 2006.155 These two data points 
show the difficulty in determining whether or not reforms have changed the 
industry.156 
The question of effectiveness is one that, especially in the context of 
this Note, should be examined with an eye to future effectiveness, not 
simply to short term changes in behavior. Spitzer did answer this question 
at the Investorside conference when he was asked whether there was a 
danger that the industry would revert back to its previous habits157 Spitzer 
responded, 
[Y]es, very often there is a flow back, things do revert. The metaphor I’ve 
used is that what we’ve gone through is like watching someone else get a 
speeding ticket. Now your first response is, “I’m glad I’m not the one who 
was caught,” your second response is to slow down for an exit or two on 
the thruway, and your third response is to put your foot on the gas pedal 
and say, “There won’t be another trooper ahead.”158 
The important follow-up questions to ask, however, are whether 
watching another company get the equivalent of a speeding ticket will 
really alter behavior and whether there are, indeed, more troopers ahead. 
VI. CRIME & PUNISHMENT, THE TRIAL OF BLANCK AND 
HARRIS AND THE TRIBULATIONS OF HENRY BLODGET 
In both Smith’s and Spitzer’s situations, the criminal justice system was 
either unwilling or unable to punish those responsible. Although, in both 
men’s defense, the bad actors were merely symptomatic of deeper problems 
within their respective industries, and the bad actors’ behavior was no better 
or worse than their cohorts. It was only poor timing, and what Blanck, 
Harris, and Blodget might have claimed was bad luck that led to their 
becoming the public face for these societal ills. 
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Both situations also ended similarly. The trial of factory owners Blanck 
and Harris proved to be a great anti-climax, even though the men were set 
upon by grieving workers and relatives as they entered the courtroom and 
confronted by many witnesses who testified to the factory’s failure to 
comply with the fire code.159 Despite the overwhelming evidence, a 
Tammany judge and a exceptionally skilled defense lawyer, Max Steuer, 
combined to help acquit both owners of murder.160 Blodget and his co-
workers paid fines and agreed never again to tout stock, but none of the 
analysts responsible at Merrill Lynch were sent to jail or even tried in a 
court of law. Spitzer has spoken about his prosecutorial philosophy in many 
interviews but has never articulated a clear rationale for not charging 
Blodget.161 The surprising fact about Spitzer’s decision is that a spokesman 
for the Attorney General’s Office commented on Spitzer’s decision not to 
bring charges against analyst Jack Grubman by saying that because the 
Attorney General’s Office could not find that “Grubman’s public and 
private views were divergent.”162 Blodget’s e-mails obviously fit the criteria 
for divergence on public and private views, yet the only action filed against 
him was by the NASD.163 
For Spitzer, it seems that a white collar prosecution of all stock analysts 
was not feasible because of the cost and sheer magnitude of such 
prosecutions. Smith saw with Blanck’s and Harris’s acquittals that societal 
forces would simply not allow the imprisonment or execution of such 
prominent businessmen. In the face of a criminal justice failure, both 
Spitzer and Smith had to search for alternate solutions to remedy the 
endemic flaws in respectively, the financial services industry and the 
manufacturing industry. 
VII. CONCLUSION: LEGISLATION V. PROSECUTION 
As Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer was not shy in calling on the 
Congress and the New York State legislature to pass legislation on a variety 
of topics. In fact, scarcely weeks before he issued a press release on Merrill 
Lynch, Spitzer called on Congress to pass a prescription drug benefit and 
tied it to his decision to file a $100 million lawsuit against Aventis and 
Andrx for keeping cheaper generic drugs off the market.164 The year before, 
Spitzer introduced what he called “Comprehensive Gun Legislation” and 
advocated that it be passed by the legislature.165 The office of the Attorney 
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General, unlike Al Smith’s position as Majority Leader of the State 
Assembly, is not intrinsically legislative; thus, it lends itself to non-
legislative solutions. Therefore, the case can be made that the investigations 
were a result of Spitzer’s desire to combat corporate misbehavior any way 
he could. However, what at first glance seemed to be the result of policy 
expediency has turned into a tactical and legislative choice. As Spitzer’s 
fame, acclaim, and clout have grown he has shown little desire to translate 
this popular support into codified laws. At some point, Spitzer’s behavior 
has to be seen less as a result of his position and more as a policy to pursue 
change through prosecution and investigation instead of through litigation. 
Taking a victory lap after the successful conclusion of his investigation, 
Spitzer testified before the Senate Commerce, Science and Technology’s 
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism.166 
Spitzer’s testimony primarily focused on his argument that federal law 
should not prevent state prosecutions like his Merrill Lynch investigation. 
As to legislative remedies, Spitzer limited his comments to a few 
statements: “Rebuild the wall between research analysts and investment 
bankers for more favorable research reports . . . ensure that analyst 
compensation is not based on investment banking revenue . . . provide 
greater disclosure to the public . . . (and) every firm should have an 
independent committee that reviews all research recommendations.”167 
Within Spitzer’s testimony and statements on the settlement, there was 
never an attempt to spell out how these reforms would be accomplished, 
and Spitzer only referred to these reforms by saying that any reform in this 
area should include these effects. He never stated whether he thought other 
reforms were needed.168 Spitzer never used his position to advocate for 
legislation the way he advocated for gun control, and he never used his 
investigations to set the stage for legislation the way he did with the 
prescription drug benefit or, as in his legislative program, for an area like 
strengthened DWI laws.169 
Spitzer has never claimed that the settlement he made with Merrill 
Lynch was the endgame to analyst regulation. In fact, despite not making it 
part of his settlement with Merrill Lynch, Spitzer did believe that the best 
solution was a total separation between investment bankers and analysts.170 
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From this notion, it is possible to assume that perhaps this was Spitzer’s 
eventual goal and something he hoped that voluntary compliance would 
accomplish. If that was indeed Spitzer’s goal, for the moment it has not 
been accomplished. 
To understand the magnitude of the opportunity lost by Spitzer’s 
decision not to seek codification of his feelings toward investment banks 
and their analysts, it is important to consider what the public could have 
gained had Spitzer decided to form a commission similar to Al Smith’s 
Factory Investigating Commission. Through the Martin Act, Spitzer would 
have had the necessary investigative power to force investment banks to 
divulge their private e-mail and correspondence.171 While we can only 
speculate what might have been discovered, it stands to reason that a 
commission would have uncovered abuses at least as galling as Henry 
Blodget’s. Like the abuses at the rope factory in Auburn, or the tales of 
children in canneries, these stories would have served to ratchet up the 
pressure of public officials to find ways to end these abuses.172 Instead of 
having to settle for piece-meal compliance with a watered down standard, a 
commission could have built momentum for a thorough overhaul of the 
industry by the New York State legislature. There is, of course, no 
guarantee that this legislative plan would have become law. However, it 
does seem that even in failure, an investigative commission would have at 
least raised awareness about the problems in the financial services industry 
and softened up the ground for future legislative attempts at reform. 
Had Al Smith merely relied on voluntary compliance, the results of the 
Triangle fire might well have been different. Assuming, as was the case 
with Merrill Lynch, that the Triangle Shirtwaist Company was publicly 
traded, and, as a result of the fire and the criminal prosecutions of Blanck 
and Harris, its stock had dropped precipitously, Triangle would have sought 
to settle with the State of New York and accepted certain voluntary 
constraints on its relations with workers. Smith might have proposed a 
watered down version of the legislation he passed, perhaps sprinkler 
systems, fire drills and adequate fire escapes. These reforms would have 
had a positive effect, but they would not have solved the deeper problems 
of worker abuse within the manufacturing industry. Fortunately, Smith took 
the more effective route, and, by striking at the heart of these abuses, he 
was able to hasten the end of worker exploitation. In contrast, by not 
seeking to systematically overhaul the research industry, Spitzer tolerated 
the continually cozy relationship between stock analysts, the companies 
they cover, and investment banks. 
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Al Smith’s decision to use the Triangle fire as a catalyst for a program 
of systematic reform can be judged as an unqualified success because it 
embraced the concept that reforms should be codified. Spitzer made three 
major decisions that contrast Smith’s approach. First, he settled with Merrill 
Lynch rather than continuing the prosecution. This approach can be 
justified in light of the reforms he wrung from the company, but 
considering the freefall of the stock, Spitzer could have wrung more 
concessions from the industry by waiting.173 His next decision was to 
choose voluntary compliance, rather than statutory enforcement through 
legislation in the New York State legislature.174 While there are pros and 
cons to both choices, it is important to note that Spitzer saw his settlement 
with Merrill Lynch as a first step towards greater reforms, although it will 
take more time to determine the true effectiveness of his choice.175 The 
independent analyst industry is still rather small, and it takes time and 
distance before one can judge the true import of reforms. 
Foreclosing a chance for legislative reform at the state level, Spitzer did 
provide the broad strokes of reform in his testimony before Congress. An 
interesting coda to his testimony is that legislation was indeed offered in the 
House of Representatives by Spitzer’s former critic, Representative 
Baker.176 While not previously known as an investor advocate and not 
necessarily known as a fan of Eliot Spitzer, Representative Baker’s bill 
contained many of the same elements of Spitzer’s settlement with Merrill 
Lynch.177 For a Republican controlled Congress, which did not appear 
receptive to any investor reforms, it was quite a surprise, yet Spitzer was 
not fully supportive. The most Representative Baker could coax from 
Spitzer at a hearing in front of the House of Representatives Financial 
Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises was that the bill was “a good start.”178 
Even the fact that leading Democrats like Massachusetts Congressman and 
Financial Services Ranking Member Barney Frank and California 
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Congresswoman Maxine Waters co-sponsored the legislation179 could not 
persuade Spitzer to wholeheartedly support it.180 Without the high profile 
support from potential backers like Spitzer, the bill eventually died in the 
Senate without a vote.181 While partisan politics or the desire to thwart an 
old enemy may have played a role, it does seem that when it comes to 
corporate malfeasance, Spitzer has placed his beliefs firmly in the corner of 
prosecution ending in voluntary settlement, even though it is made under 
duress reforms instead of legislation. 
For an argument against the efficacy of relying on prosecution, look no 
further than Spitzer’s predecessor and his successor. Spitzer’s predecessor 
and electoral victim, Dennis Vacco, built his career in Buffalo on child 
pornography prosecutions.182 These prosecutions made him visible and 
popular, and they were a perfect launching pad to statewide office, but they 
bore no relation to Spitzer’s current role in regulating business. New 
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo often pledged to model his 
administration after Spitzer’s, but his first actions in office show a wide 
difference in priorities. Shortly after taking office, Cuomo announced that 
his staff would examine the over 6,000 member items passed by Albany, 
looking for waste, fraud and mismanagement.183 While pursuing official 
corruption and child pornography are laudable goals, they bring to light the 
difficulty of pursuing compliance mainly through prosecution. It is unlikely 
that an Attorney General in the mold of Dennis Vacco would be nearly as 
aggressive as Eliot Spitzer had been, and just days into the post-Spitzer era, 
the prosecutorial priorities of the New York State Attorney General’s Office 
are no longer the same. 
Here is concrete evidence that an uncodified standard for future 
enforcement revolves almost entirely around the views of a single elected 
official. If Spitzer’s successors had been in the same mold as the “Lantern 
Jawed Crime Fighter,” as the New York Post called Spitzer, there may well 
be continued Wall Street investigations.184 But if his successors are mere 
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mortals, there is nothing preventing future Attorney Generals from 
returning to Vacco’s, Abram’s, or Lefkowitz’s traditional functions.185 
Eliot Spitzer’s campaign to clean up Wall Street started with a bang, but 
just five years later Attorney General Andrew Cuomo’s pronouncement of a 
new focus on public corruption ended that campaign with a whimper.186 No 
protests issued forth from the newly elected Governor, no howls of 
discontent from any highly placed sources. The only news from the 
Governor’s mansion was a list of priorities for the coming legislative 
session, none of which related to corporate governance.187 In his previously 
mentioned speech to Investorside, Spitzer placed a great deal of importance 
on making sure that there is always “another trooper” up ahead, even going 
so far as to say, “[W]e in the prosecutorial community have to keep our eye 
out more aggressively . . . and the burden is on us to do that.188 Spitzer may 
now feel that federal regulators have been awoken, but considering his 
feelings on their previous failures,189 beyond the headlines and effusive 
praise his investigations have garnered, the most important question to ask 
about Eliot Spitzer is: Why? Why pursue such a strategy and why turn your 
back on issue formerly of such concern and importance? 
To illustrate the utilitarian nature of Spitzer’s actions are two of his 
statements regarding the S.E.C. and its actions during his investigations. On 
November 4, 2003, Eliot Spitzer closed his testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored 
Enterprises of the House of Representatives Committee on Financial 
Services with the unsolicited comment: “The S.E.C. enforcement staff does 
a terrific job. They are aggressive, tough [and] smart prosecutors. I remain 
committed to working together with them and others as we continue our 
investigations and think about solutions.”190 This seemingly laudatory 
comment flew directly in the face of a comment Spitzer made less than four 
months later at a meeting with the U.S.A. Today editorial board: “[T]he 
S.E.C. had become like every other lumbering bureaucracy: so big, so 
segmented . . . . How could they have missed the market timing, the late 
trading? They got lazy. They simply failed to be as aggressive as they 
should have been.”191 The only explanation for the two contradictory 
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positions is that, like Las Vegas, what happens in the House of 
Representatives Subcommittee meetings, often stays there. The same can 
not be said of an editorial meeting at the nation’s largest newspaper. 
Later in the interview, Spitzer’s comments in response to a question on 
what was the best means of enforcement show his differing positions: 
“Fines don’t do it. Fines get passed through and disappear into the ether. 
Prison sentences and shame, that’s the answer.”192 These bellicose quotes 
fly right in the face of Eliot Spitzer’s actions. The subhead of the Attorney 
General’s Office press release was the size of Merrill Lynch’s fine and in an 
interview with Money Magazine, Spitzer’s reply to a question concerning 
Henry Blodget’s future was, “I think we have to understand whether the 
structures we have in place work and function—and we have to try to do so 
without vilifying individuals, which is not a productive thing to do. . . .”193 
Again, the specialized nature of subscribers of Money Magazine conflicts 
with the general nature of those of U.S.A. Today, and thus the answers 
given are different. 
Currently, with executive, and now legislative, tools at his disposal, 
Eliot Spitzer’s quest to tame Albany may yet be assured whether through 
fines, agreements, prison sentences, or even outright electoral victory. He 
may indeed enjoy a brief sojourn in Albany and then on to Washington, 
D.C., but the question again is: Why? What lasting effects will his tenure 
have had, what markers will he have left behind him, and whose lives will 
his policies have changed aside from the greater glory of Eliot Spitzer? 
Al Smith was defeated in his first re-election campaign for Governor 
and lost by a landslide when he ran for President, but his ideas endured. By 
codifying his beliefs, he gave them an opportunity to speak for themselves 
outside of his shortcomings as a candidate. Legislation, even if it is 
compromised or watered down, sets a baseline of acceptable conduct. 
Abuses may continue to occur but they will only fuel the drive for reform. 
Seeking change through legislative reforms may not garner the same 
headlines or public praise as giving a publicly traded company a good 
public pillorying, but what it will do is protect the factory workers and the 
investors who come long after the commission has packed up and gone 
home and the press conference has ended. 
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